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As other nations expand access to hedgefunds,
should the U.S. adopt tighter regulation?

The Challenge
of Hedge Fund
Regulation
By HOUMAN B. SHADAB
Mvercatus Center

"hedge fund" is a private investment vehicle that is less regulated than traditional
investment companies. The name comes
from the funds' traditional role as
"hedges" against downturns in more conventional investments. Hedge funds have
historically taken investment positions
that are relatively uncorrelated with broader financial markets
or that may be in opposition to broader markets. In more recent
years, the term has been expanded to cover funds that employ
very complex investment strategies. Once relatively obscure
and, by federal statute, reserved for very wealthy investors, hedge
funds today manage nearly $1.5 trillion in assets for investors
that include pension funds and university endowments.
Academics, industry professionals, and regulatory authorities overwhelmingly agree that hedge funds benefit the economy by mitigating price downturns, bearing risks that others
will not, making securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies. Those benefits are possible because hedge funds are
subject to much less regulation than most investment companies. Compared to mutual funds, hedge funds are less
restricted in their use of derivatives and leverage, and have
greater incentives to do so because they are not required to disclose their strategies or holdings publicly.
Less regulation also raises important concerns about the
risks the funds pose to investors and the funds' potential to
destabilize the economy - the latter concern underscored by
the spectacular 1998 contraction of the fund Long-Term CapHouman B. Shadab is a senior research fellow in the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University. He may be contacted by e-mail at hshadab@gmu.edu.
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ital Management. Those worries have led to calls for tighter
regulation or oversight.
In this article, I will show that such concerns turn out to
be less substantial when considered carefully, and that hedge
funds are reducing their risks for investors and other market
participants. Because more regulation may reduce hedge
funds' benefits to investors and the economy, policymakers
should consider whether additional regulation will do more
harm than good.
HEDGE FUND BASICS
Because of their different properties and practices, hedge
funds as a group are best understood from a legal, not economic, perspective.
Hedge funds typically are exempt from the registration and
disclosure requirements of federal securities laws, including
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(Advisers Act), and the Investment Company Act of 1940. The
funds are also not prohibited from leveraged trading, short-selling, or concentrated investing. To qualify for those exemptions,
hedge funds may not advertise and can only accept investments
from large institutions and wealthy individuals.
REGULATIONs Despite the exemptions, hedge funds are subject to government regulation and oversight. Federal securities law prohibits hedge funds from fraud and insider trading.
In 2006, 86 percent of hedge funds were registered with some
regulatory body (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission or Commodity Futures Trading Commission), accord-

ing to a Hennessee Hedge Fund Manager Survey. Hedge fund managers are
also considered legal fiduciaries under
the Advisers Act, which requires fund
managers to put the interests of their
funds above their personal interests.
Hedge funds must make substantial disclosures to potential investors
in order to discharge fiduciary duties
and avoid running afoul of anti-fraud
rules prohibiting "misleading statements" and "omissions." The Exchange
Act requires hedge funds to report to
the SEC any nontrivial holdings in public companies, and also all of their stock
holdings on a quarterly basis if the fund
has more than $100 million invested in
public companies. It is also not uncommon for a fund to trade futures or commodity options contracts so as to come
under the scrutiny of the CFTC, or for
a fund to have 25 percent or more of its
equity assets owned by a qualified
employee benefit plan such that it must
comply with the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).
Indirect regulation also applies to
hedge funds. Federal treasury regulations
limit the ability ofbanks to lend to hedge
funds, and Regulation T of the Federal
Reserve Board likewise limits securities
broker-dealers. Banks must also comply
with minimum risk-based capital
requirements under the Basel capital
accord and are subject to inspection by
bank supervisors for exposures to risk.
MANAGERS AND STYLES Traditional-

O

ly, financial market regulation aims to
protect investors from fraud and the
"agency costs" associated with delegating investment decisions to a third
party. The legal and economic structure of hedge funds substantially protects investors. Managers often invest
their own money in their funds and,
because the funds are usually structured as limited partnerships, managers may be personally on the hook for
their funds' liabilities. Perhaps more
importantly, on top of a fixed 1 or 2
percent management fee, managers typically earn a performance-based fee of
20 percent, which usually does not trigger until any previous losses are
recouped. Managers therefore have
strong incentives to benefit investors
REGULATION SPRING 2007
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and are discouraged from performance-reducing conduct
such as excessive risk-taking. Indeed, hedge fund managers
with more control and performance incentives produce higher returns for investors.
Career concerns also constrain hedge fund managers who
might otherwise take on too much risk. Studies show that
managers' concerns about poor performance and termination
offset incentives for excessive risk-taking and that career concerns motivate managers to take on less risk as their experience grows. Creditors and counterparties also monitor managerial conduct, adding another layer of safety for investors.
Policymakers should therefore be wary of disturbing a relationship where interests are fundamentally aligned and market failure is not present.
Fund managers employ numerous specific investment
styles, each with its own risk and return profile. Three basic
styles include directional investing (seeking returns from price
gains or declines in specific markets), corporate event-driven
(seeking to profit from events like mergers or bankruptcies),
and arbitrage (seeking returns based on inefficient price discrepancies). Equity long/short funds, which hedge standard
stock purchases by short-selling others, are the most popular,
constituting about one-third of the industry. Hedge funds may
also focus on specific industries or geographic regions, and
they invest in everything from the bonds of failing companies
to Hollywood blockbusters.
The hedge fund industry is experiencing rapid growth, institutionalization, and increasing stability - all signs of an industry that is coming of age.
Today, hedge funds comprise almost $1.5 trillion in assets
spread through more than 10,000 funds worldwide. Analysts
expect the size of the industry to double by the end of the
decade, but the number of funds to stabilize. Profit opportunities may likewise diminish as the industry becomes more
crowded. Returns in 2005 and 2006 were down from prior
years, and the rapid inflows of capital may reflect a bubble in
some parts of the industry.
Hedge funds increasingly depend upon others to provide
services. The most significant service providers are parties on
the other side of hedge fund transactions (counterparties), in
particular investment banks and securities broker-dealers offering "prime brokerage" services. Those services include consolidation and settling trades, managing risk, and providing leverage through loans, securities lending, and derivatives trading.
In addition to being counterparties to individual hedge funds,
large investment banks are also leading the institutionalization
of hedge funds by becoming managers themselves.
While individual investors comprise the largest source of
capital for hedge funds, institutional investors are increasingly
participating in them. Although only about 1 percent of U.S.
pension assets are invested into hedge funds; over the next several years, the number of pensions and their allocations to
hedge funds is expected to increase substantially. As pensions
continue to increase their involvement in hedge funds, compliance with the requirements of ERISA will likely be more
commonplace.
MATURING INDUSTRY
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Few generalizations meaningful to investors
can be made about hedge funds as a whole because returns and
risk vary greatly among different strategies. Nonetheless, policymakers should be aware of the following:
In contrast to traditional mutual funds, the goal of most
hedge funds is to deliver positive (absolute) returns in both up
and down markets. This is possible because, not being subject
to most trading regulations, hedge funds may engage in shortselling and other trades to profit from downturns. As a class,
hedge funds deliver positive returns but do not always beat
general market indices or mutual funds. Academic research
estimates that hedge funds returned anywhere from 9 to 14
percent over a period of 10 or more years. Hedge fund returns
may or may not beat those of the market as a whole, however; since 2003, hedge funds have underperformed the market.
That hedge fund returns do not consistently outperform
the market may come as no surprise, according to classical
finance theory. The efficient market hypothesis postulates that
current asset prices already reflect all available knowledge relevant to public companies, and trying to pick undervalued
stocks is futile. As Burton Malkiel's "random walk" theory
famously asserts, active fund managers have no discernable
stock-picking ability and investors are better off with a passive
and diversified portfolio (e.g., investing in the S&P 500). In a
2005 article in the FinancialAnalysts Journal, Malkiel and
Antanu Saha found that, because of biases in performance
data, industry-provided hedge fund returns from 1996 to
2003 were overstated by almost 4.5 percent and actually underperformed the market during the same period.
However, hedge funds do have an important virtue in that
their returns have relatively low correlation with market returns
and can thus help to insulate portfolios from overall market
volatility. For instance, in a 2006 National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, Boyson et al. find almost no evidence
that extreme losses in currency and equity markets are correlated to extreme losses in the hedge fund sector. In fact, hedge funds
escaped the post-Internet bubble bear market and earned positive returns while markets and mutual funds languished.
More generally, when taking risk into account, researchers
have found that hedge funds deliver investors superior riskadjusted performance - so-called "alpha" - in both up and
down markets. However, some find that alpha may now be
decreasing because the growth in investment in hedge funds
means that more money is chasing relatively fewer opportunities, and there is debate about how long the superior performance will persist.
PERFORMANCE

PERFORMANCE AND POLICY
Given this information, it is
curious that hedge funds have gained the attention of policymakers and regulators. Hedge fund investing is not uniformly more risky than investing in a mutual fund or the stock
of a single corporation. In down markets, it typically is safer.
While some types of hedge funds exhibit erratic returns or an
unusually high risk of negative performance, what matters to
investors is not the risk of a single fund in isolation, but the
potential for several funds to improve an already diverse investment portfolio.

For example, pension plans find hedge funds attractive
precisely because they produce some of the high returns of
stock investing while reducing losses in market downturns.
This allows the pension fund to garner long-term growth
while reducing the risk of large losses in a bear market. However, the role hedge funds should play in a portfolio is unsettled, and some argue that hedge funds offer little value to most
investors, especially after taxes.
Reducing barriers to investing in hedge funds would allow
more people to benefit. Unfortunately, the SEC in December
2006 proposed a rule to increase hedge fund net worth requirements for participants. It is estimated that the proposed new
requirements would reduce household participation by 88 percent. That would leave the benefits of individual investment in
hedge funds open only to the wealthiest people. By contrast, Australia imposes virtually no restrictions on who may invest in
hedge funds registered with the Australian Securities & Investments Commission, and Canada and the United Kingdom may
be moving toward opening hedge funds to more investors, following recent moves by several European nations. In light of the
benefits hedge funds offer to individual investors, the SEC should
increase, rather than decrease, individuals' access.
SYSTEMIC RISK

A central concern of policymakers is hedge funds' "systemic
risk" - the risk they pose to economic actors outside of the
groups of hedge fund investors. Systemic risk arises because
hedge fund losses can spread to third parties, such as banks
and securities traders. Exposing third parties to hidden risks
is a market failure to the extent that third parties are unable
to act on such risks by, for example, requiring better credit
terms with a bank acting as a hedge fund counterparty. Noting the substantial role that funds play in reducing some systemic risks (e.g., short-selling stock during price bubbles)
cannot alleviate concerns about systemic risk generally,
because the very same activities that reduce some risks may
increase others.
Systemic risk is hardly unique to hedge funds (e.g., risk to
counterparties and price bubbles). All financial institutions
carry a degree of this risk. The question for policymakers is
whether hedge funds' systemic risk is socially undesirable and
remediable by lawmaking.
The cautionary tale fueling the fears about hedge
funds' systemic risk is the implosion, federal bailout, and
ultimate folding of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).
The fund lost $4.4 billion in 1998 by, among other things, predicting that spreads between the returns on bonds of developing and industrialized nations would narrow. The Federal
Reserve organized the bailout, fearing a default by LTCM
would send shockwaves throughout the world economy.
LTCM is a spectacular case, to be sure. But it offers little in
the way of broader lessons about hedge fund regulation. First,
LTCM is not representative of hedge funds today. The fund's loss
stemmed from its own unique characteristics combined with a
series ofvery unlikely events, including the 1997 Asian currency crisis and the government of Russia defaulting on its loans
LTCM

in August of 1998. Second, LTCM's extreme leverage, which
rose as high as 30:1 before the Federal Reserve intervened, is now
a rarity. Third, if the government had not intervened, LTCM
would not have collapsed: a consortium of banks led by Berkshire Hathaway offered to buy the fund's positions and continue
to run it. Perhaps most importantly, even if LTCM had collapsed, its counterparties could have absorbed LTCM's losses in
the event of a default. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets' 1999 report noted that, as of September 1998,
aggregate U.S. bank exposure to all hedge funds through direct
lending and derivatives contracts, including LTCM, was only
about 1 percent of total bank credit exposures.
CONTAGION Instead of the collapse of a single large fund, a
more likely source of systemic risk is multiple funds, perhaps
even funds with different styles, failing at the same time and
spreading shockwaves throughout the economy, a phenomenon known as "contagion." Related aspects of contagion are
"liquidity risk" (being required to dump investments at a
major loss), risk to counterparties, and "herding" (different
funds making the same investment, which might then go
bad). For example, several funds may end up on the wrong side
of the same investment (herd) and be forced to sell at a major
loss (liquidity risk), which, in turn, spreads losses to lenders
and the counterparties and third parties who deal with them.
Worries about market failure from contagion are mostly
hypothetical. Few academic studies of hedge funds directly
address systemic risk, and none conclude that the threat is
large or even offer a definitive measure or assessment.
FUND FAILURE

The low risk of contagion is revealed in how

often and what types of funds fail. Although estimates of the rate
of hedge fund failure differ significantly, those studies isolating
hedge funds that genuinely fail from those that merely stop disclosing returns find failure rates to be somewhere between 3 and
5 percent, with no trend of increasing failure. Indeed, a recent
study by the Hennessee Group noted a declining trend in hedge
fund attrition and predicted the trend to continue.
A 2003 white paper by Stuart Feffer and Christopher Kundro notes that managers more often chose to liquidate funds
because they did not meet performance expectations than
because losses forced them to cease operations. Feffer and Kundro also found that operational issues are by far the largest reason hedge funds fail. This finding implies that the strides being
made in operational management will reduce the failure rates.
Importantly, almost all empirical studies find that larger funds
and those with more experienced managers have lower failure
rates. This mitigates concerns about the risk of large fund collapses and suggests that the industry may be less prone to failure as the average fund size grows and industry experience
becomes more widespread. And even when hedge funds do fail,
investors are unlikely to lose all of their capital.
With no measure or complete picture of systemic risk, there
is little basis to conclude that such risk is pervasive, unmanageable, or warrants further regulation of hedge funds, particularly as federal limitations on banks and other counterparties already regulate systemic risk exposures. Without a
REGULATION SPRING 2007
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more definite assessment, any attempt to make hedge funds
further internalize systemic risks would at best be premature
and require policymakers to act arbitrarily.
TRENDS
Trends in the hedge fund industry indicate continual improvements in their ability to handle systemic risk and reflect a
much larger movement towards stability throughout global
financial markets. Policymakers must acknowledge such trends
because the history of financial markets regulation reveals
that technological and financial innovations often render regulations obsolete, requiring them to be restructured or
repealed. The hedge fund industry's rapidly changing structure
and practices almost guarantee that new regulation would at
best be redundant and might even stifle further developments.
Being leveraged means being able to lose or gain more
than the initial amount invested (i.e., the equity capital). Borrowing and using derivatives (contracts whose prices derive from
the price of some other asset) are common sources of hedge
fund leverage. Significant leverage runs the danger of magnifying losses to many multiples of the capital actually invested.
Though LTCM was heavily leveraged, most accounts indicate that hedge funds generally make much less use of borrowing and derivatives. According to an industry database, as
ofJune 2005, one-third of hedge fund assets used no leverage
at all, and over half had a 2:1 ratio (i.e., $1 of equity for every
$3 of asset value). A 2005 interview-based study by the financial adviser TABB Group estimated that half of all funds have
a 3:1 leverage ratio while only 3 percent have a ratio of 7:1 or
more. Fixed income arbitrage hedge funds, which have the
highest average leverage ratio of 4:1, only make up about 7 percent of the industry. While not perfect comparisons, investment banks and securities firms are typically leveraged at a
ratio of 20: 1, while commercial banks average about 10:1.
Academic and industry studies also show that, since the
time of LTCM, hedge funds have decreased their use of leverage considerably and do not show signs of significant trends
in the opposite direction. Hedge funds leveraging through
derivatives trading tend to reduce risk exposures, especially
with respect to market downturns and crashes. These facts
undermine concerns that hedge funds' widespread use of
derivatives, once described as "financial weapons of mass
destruction" by Warren Buffet, contributes significantly to systemic risk. Studies also overwhelmingly find that greater
leverage does not increase the likelihood of hedge fund failure. In any case, in a 2005 JournalofFinancialEconomics article, Anurag Gupta and Bing Liang show that leverage per se
does not tell us much about risk. They instead look to whether
funds have adequate equity capital relative to the risk of the
underlying investments. They found that, as of March 2003,
less than 4 percent of operating funds (constituting only 1.2
percent of total assets) were undercapitalized.
LEVERAGE

RISK MANAGEMENT The hedge fund industry has come along

way from LTCM. Since that time, risk management has significantly improved, not only in the hedge fund industry but also
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in financial markets more broadly. This contributes to investor
protection and economic stability. These improvements are due
to rising industry awareness of the collective importance of risk
and the shifting economic landscape more generally.
For instance, in response to LTCM, 12 major commercial
and investment banks formed the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group inJanuary 1999. The group issued two
massive reports, one in June of 1999 and another in July of
2005, detailing how the financial sector could improve risk
management practices. As noted in the 2005 report, and
recently attested to by numerous regulators and commentators, developments in financial markets over the better part
of the last decade substantially increased resilience to shocks
and reduced the already low probability of contagion from
hedge funds or other institutions. Those improvements resulted from enhanced risk management, financial innovation,
and the greater liquidity brought about by hedge fund and private equity trading.
According to a survey by consultancy Mercer Oliver
Wyman, hedge funds and counterparties acted in accordance
with third-party recommendations by continuing to standardize procedures, employ more sophisticated controls, and
commit significant resources to risk personnel, operations,
and external monitoring. For example, stress-testing is now
common throughout the industry, as is active monitoring of,
and limiting exposure to, concentrated positions.
The underlying economics of the industry are driving the
improvements, indicating that hedge funds and counterparties
will have the incentive and means to continue along the path
toward greater stability. The rising involvement of investment
banks as fund managers and as prime brokers, for example,
increases capabilities to bear and monitor risk as parties with
more sophisticated management systems, expertise, and
resources enter the field. Recently, third parties such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's started offering independent
hedge fund risk rating services to address investor demand for
the information.
As regulators and industry groups duly recognize, hedge fund
risk management still faces significant challenges, in particular
from valuation difficulties and operational risks associated with
private, over-the-counter derivatives trading. The current combination of low interest rates and macroeconomic stability also
encourages players like hedge funds to take on more risks.
Nonetheless, the industry today seems capable of handling the
risk management issues it faces without the need for additional
regulation. The failure ofAmaranth Advisors in September 2006,
the largest collapse in hedge fund history, is a case in point.
Although the fund lost $6.6 billion on natural gas trades in a few
weeks (about one-third more than LTCM lost over several
months), counterparties and the market hardly noticed. Amaranth's assets were quickly purchased, its losses did not spread
beyond investors (who recovered one-third oftheir investments),
and counterparties recovered every penny of their collateral.
TRANSPARENCY Closely related to improving risk management, a voluntary increase in transparency is one of the most
important changes taking place in the hedge fund industry.

The economic theory of disclosure predicts that hedge funds
will disclose information only to the point where the benefits
equal the costs. The benefits of disclosure are that a fund can
attract more investors, obtain terms more favorable to the
fund (e.g., higher fees), and raise capital and enter into trades
with counterparties at a lower cost. The costs of mandatory
disclosure primarily include the expenses involved in making
the disclosure and the decreased competitiveness from informing competitors of proprietary trading strategies.
Hedge funds are increasingly finding that greater transparency is a net benefit, and there is a trend toward disclosing information by voluntarily registering with regulatory
bodies. While 61 percent of firms were registered with some
regulatory body in 2005, 86 percent of funds are registered
today. The increase at least partially reflects registration in
response to the now-overturned SEC registration rule. However, that hedge funds are now free to deregister (or could have
avoided the registration requirement altogether) indicates
that a significant portion of funds found it in their interest
to register or remain registered to signal quality to investors.
Ninety percent of those funds registered pursuant to the nowdefunct SEC rule chose to remain registered.
Hedge funds' incentives to please investors are driving
increased transparency. Institutional investors, who are
increasingly turning to hedge funds, often demand greater
transparency than individual investors and rely more on thirdparty research services. The same dynamic applies to funds of
hedge fund managers. More transparency is also likely to
result as competition pushes funds to differentiate themselves. Hedge funds' efforts to reduce costs by outsourcing
operational functions are also leading to more transparency
by allowing prime brokers and others to track fund investments and trades.
The need for capital is also driving transparency. In February 2007, Fortress Investment Group raised $634 million by
being the first U.S. asset manager involved with hedge funds
to go public. In December 2006, Citadel Finance, a unit of a
$12 billion hedge fund, borrowed $500 million by issuing
bonds, another first for U.S. markets. In order to raise the cap-

ital, both Fortress and Citadel were required to disclose previously proprietary information, and some analysts consider
the moves part of a larger trend.
However, there is a limit to the benefits of transparency. At
some point, hedge funds will lose by making valuable trading
strategies available to competitors. But because the optimal
amount of disclosure is different for each fund, mandatory disclosure rules would certainly force too much disclosure for
some funds and reduce their returns.
There is another shortcoming of mandatory disclosure
particular to hedge funds. Because of their complex and
dynamic trading strategies, precise risk exposures are often difficult to estimate. That is why Federal Reserve chairman Ben
Bernanke in May 2006 noted the insurmountable difficulties
for mandatory disclosure to provide useful information about
risk. Regulators would need to gather sensitive information
from all major financial market participants, process the massive and fluctuating data accurately and at least daily, and
respond to a high risk exposure without causing a liquidity crisis (e.g., by forcing funds to simultaneously exit the same
risky position). Accordingly, Bernanke rejected the idea that
regulators should create a database of hedge fund positions.
New mandatory disclosure requirements would thus not
only carry the burden of compliance costs, but could also
reduce performance, crowd the market with uninformative
data, overwhelm regulators, and undermine the incentives for
investors and lenders to engage in due diligence. Accordingly,
the case for mandatory disclosure is tenuous at best.
CONCLUSION
The many remaining questions about hedge funds will keep
researchers busy for years to come. Policymakers, however,
have strong reason to believe that hedge funds do not pose
exceptional risks to investors or economic stability, and that
additional regulation runs the danger of dampening fund
performance and U.S. competitiveness without any clear benefits. In the face of a rapidly changing industry not suffering
from market failure, introducing beneficial regulation is a
II
challenge nearly impossible to meet.

Readings
* "Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A
Bayesian and Bootstrap Analysis," by Robert
Kosowski, Narayan Y. Naik, and Melvyn Teo.
Journal of FinancialEconomics, forthcoming.
= "Do Hedge Funds Have Enough Capital? A
Value-at-Risk Approach," by Anurag Gupta
and Bing Liang. Journal ofFinancialEconomics,
Vol. 77 (July 2005).
* "Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk-Based
Approach," by William Fung and David A.
Hsieh. FinancialAnalysts journal, Vol. 60
(September/October 2004).
* "Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk and Capital
Formation," by William Fung, David A. Hsieh,
Narayan Y. Naik, and Tarun Ramadorai. AFA
2007 Chicago meetings paper, 2006.

* "Hedge Funds: Risk and Return," by Burton
G. Malkiel and Antanu Saha. Financial
Analysts Journal,Vol. 61 (2005).
* "Is There Hedge Fund Contagion?" by
Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. Stahel, and
Rene M. Stulz. National Bureau of Economic
Research working paper, 2006.

* "Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds," by
Nicholas Chan, Mila Getmansky, Shane M.
Haas, and Andrew W. Lo. National Bureau of
Economic Research working paper, 2005.
* "The A, B, Cs of Hedge Funds: Alphas,
Betas, and Costs," by Roger G. Ibbotson and
Peng Chen. Yale ICF working paper, 2006.

* "Market Volatility, Investor Flows, and the
Structure of Hedge Fund Markets," by Bing
Liang, Russ Wermers, Bill Ding, and Mila
Getmansky. Working paper, 2006.

* "Time-Varying Exposures and Leverage in
Hedge Funds," by Patrick McGuire, Eli
Remolona, and Kostas Tsatsaronis. BIS
Quarterly Review, March 2005.

* "Role of Managerial Incentives and
Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance," by
Vikas Agarwal, N. Daniel, and N.Y. Naik.
London Business School working paper, 2005.

* "Understanding and Mitigating
Operational Risk in Hedge Fund
Investments," by Stuart Feffer and
Christopher Kundro. Capco, 2003.

REGULATION SPRING 2007

41

